# On Adaptive Attacks to Adversarial Example Defenses

NeurIPS 2020



Florian Tramèr\*



Nicholas Carlini\*




Wieland Brendel\*



Aleksander Mądry


\*equal contribution

# What Are Adversarial Examples?



Biggio et al., 2014 Szegedy et al., 2014 Goodfellow et al., 2015

# Many Defenses Are Proposed...



https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing/2019/all-adversarial-example-papers.html

## ... But Evaluating Them Properly Is Hard

# Adversarial Examples Are Not Easily Detected: Bypassing Ten Detection Methods

Nicholas Carlini David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

Broke 10 (mainly unpublished) defenses in 2017

Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security: Circumventing Defenses to Adversarial Examples

Anish Athalye \* 1 Nicholas Carlini \* 2 David Wagner 2

Broke 7 defenses published at ICLR 2018

### The Good: Consensus On Strong Evaluation Standards

#### **Clearly defined threat model**

- 1. White-box: adversary has access to defense parameters
- 2. Small perturbations: find x' s.t. x' misclassified and  $||x - x'||_p \le \varepsilon$


#### **Adaptive Evaluation**


Adversary tailors the attack to the defense

Carlini & Wagner, 2017, Athalye et al., 2018, Carlini et al. 2019,


..

### The Good: Adoption Of Strong Evaluation Standards





#### The Bad: Defenses Are Still Broken



#### We circumvent all of them!

 $\Rightarrow$  accuracy reduced to baseline (usually 0%) in the considered threat model

Many defenses are not evaluated against a strong adaptive attack

#### Our Work

# 13 case studies on how to design strong(er) adaptive attacks

#### Including:

- Our hypotheses when reading each defense's paper/code
- Things we tried but that didn't work
- Some things we didn't try but might also have worked

#### Conclusion

Evaluating adversarial examples defenses is hard!

Defenses must be evaluated against strong adaptive attacks

# How do we design strong adaptive attacks?

- 1. **Practice!** Try breaking other defenses before evaluating your own
- 2. Simplicity! Simple attacks are often easier to debug, and improve
- **3. Focus!** Find the defense's weakest component, and attack exactly that

https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.08347

https://github.com/wielandbrendel/adaptive attacks paper