


AdVersarial: Perceptual Ad Blocking meets Adversarial Machine Learning

Florian Tramèr

November 14th 2019

Joint work with Pascal Dupré, Gili Rusak, Giancarlo Pellegrino and Dan Boneh

The Future of Ad-Blocking




easylist.txt
...markup...
...URLs...

???



This is an ad



Human distinguishability of ads


- > *Legal requirement (U.S. FTC, EU E-Commerce)*
- > *Industry self-regulation on ad-disclosure*

Towards Computer Vision for Ad-Blocking

Why not detect ad-disclosures programmatically?

```
<a><span>
<span class="c1">Sp</span>
<span class="c2">S</span>
<span class="c1">on</span>
<span class="c2">S</span>
<span class="c1">so</span>
<span class="c2">S</span>
<span class="c1">red</span>
<span class="c2">S</span>
</span></a>

.c2 { font-size: 0; }
```



New arms race on HTML obfuscation

E.g., Facebook vs uBlockOrigin:


<https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uAssets/issues/3367>

>1 year, >275 comments, and counting...

Exact image matching is not enough

Perceptual Ad-Blocking

- **Ad Highlighter** [Storey et al., 2017]
 - > *Visually detects ad-disclosures*
 - > *Traditional computer vision techniques*
 - > *Similar techniques deployed in Adblock Plus*



- **Sentinel** by Adblock Plus [Paraska, 2018]
 - > *Locates ads in Facebook screenshots using neural networks*



- **Percival** by Brave [Din et al., 2019]
 - > *Neural network embedded in Chromium's rendering pipeline*



Perceptual Ad-Blocking

Business ▶ Policy

Will the MOAB (Mother Of all AdBlockers) finally kill advertising?

'Perceptual ad blocker' cannot be defeated, researchers claim

By Andrew Orlowski 19 Apr 2017 at 08:35


178  SHARE ▼



Adblock Plus Re-Invents Ad-Blocking Future Through People-Powered Artificial Intelligence


Adblock Plus launches AI-powered ad detector "Sentinel," and invites people worldwide to train neural network algorithms to understand what bad ads look like

MOTHERBOARD




PERCEPTUAL AD BLOCKING | By Jason Koebler | Apr 14 2017, 10:47am

Princeton's Ad-Blocking Superweapon May Put an End to



How Secure is Perceptual Ad-Blocking?




AdChoices

AdChoices



Jerry uploads malicious content
...



... so that Tom's post gets blocked

The Current State of ML

ML works well on average

≠


ML works well on adversarial data

Adversarial Examples



"panda"
57.7% confidence

+ ϵ



$\epsilon \approx 2/255$

=



"gibbon"
99.3% confidence

Szegedy et al., 2014
Goodfellow et al., 2015

What's the Threat Model?



(Eykholt et al. 2017)



(Eykholt et al. 2018)



What's the Threat Model?



Is there an adversary?



Are there no simpler attacks?

- *Misclassified clean examples?*
- *Attacks that affect human perception too?*



White-box access to the model?

- *Or query access / access to training data?*



**Unless the answer to all these questions is Yes,
adversarial examples are likely not the most relevant threat**

Adversarial Examples for Perceptual Ad-Blockers




Ad-Block Evasion


- **Goal: Make ads unrecognizable by ad-blocker**
- Adversary = Website publisher 
- Other adversaries exist (e.g., Ad-Network)

Evasion: Universal Transparent Overlay

Web publisher perturbs every rendered pixel



```
<div id="overlay"></div>
```



```
#overlay {  
  background-image:  
    url("data:image/png;base64,...");  
  width: 100%; height: 100%; top: 0; left: 0;  
  position: fixed; z-index: 10000;  
  opacity: 0.01;  
  pointer-events: none;  
}
```

Use HTML *tiling* to minimize perturbation size (20 KB)

- 100% success rate on 20 webpages not used to create the overlay
- The attack is **universal**: the overlay is computed once and works for all (or most) websites
- Attack can be made stealthier without relying on CSS

Ad-Block Detection

- **Goal: Trigger ad-blocker on “honeypot” content**
 - > *Detect ad-blocking in client-side JavaScript or on server*
 - > *Applicability of these attacks depends on ad-blocker type*




- Adversary = Website publisher
 - > *Use client-side JavaScript to detect DOM changes*


Detection: Perturb fixed page layout

Publisher adds honeypot in page-region with fixed layout

> *E.g., page header*



original




With honeypot header

New Threats: Privilege Abuse

Ad-block evasion & detection is a well-known arms race. But there's more!

Jerry uploads
malicious content
...




... so that Tom's
post gets blocked

What happened?

- *Object detector model generates box predictions from full page inputs*
- *Content from one user can affect predictions anywhere on page*
- *Model's segmentation is not aligned with web-security boundaries*

Defense Strategies

- Obfuscate the ad-blocker?
- Randomize the ad-blocker?
- Pro-actively retrain the model. (Adversarial training)



The Most Challenging Threat Model for ML

- Adversary has *white-box access* to ad-blocker
- Adversary can exploit *False Negatives and False Positives* in classification pipeline
- Adversary prepares attacks *offline* ⇔ The ad-blocker must defend against attacks in *real-time* in the user's browser
- Adversary can take part in *crowd-sourced* data collection for training the ad-blocker

Take Away

- **Emulating human detection of ads** *could be* the end-game for ad-blockers
 - > *But very hard (impossible?) with current computer vision techniques*
- Perceptual ad-blockers must survive an **extremely strong threat model**
 - > *This threat model perfectly aligns with white-box adversarial examples*
 - > *Will we soon see adversarial examples used by real-world adversaries?*
- More in the paper
 - > *Unified architecture + attacks for all perceptual ad-blocker designs*
 - > *Similar attacks for non-Web ad-blockers (e.g., Adblock Radio)*



 [ftramer / ad-versarial](#)

- Train a page-based ad-blocker
- Download pre-trained models
- Attack demos

Research Impact

When
Anonym
Serious
research
Depot
very in
Reply

Shut down unethical project #1

[Open](#) impredica



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
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was partially supported by NSF, ONR, the Simons Foundation, a Google faculty fellowship, the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF project P1SKP2_178149), and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) through funding for the CISPA-Stanford Center for Cybersecurity (FKZ: 13N1S0762).




How does a Perceptual Ad-Blocker Work?



- **Element-based** (e.g., find all `` tags) [Storey et al. 2017]
- **Frame-based** (segment rendered webpage into “frames” as in Percival)
- **Page-based** (unsegmented screenshots à-la-Sentinel)

Building a Page-Based Ad-Blocker

We trained a neural network to detect ads on [news websites](#) from all G20 nations



Video taken from 5 websites *not used during training*

Defense Strategies

- Obfuscate the ad-blocker?
 - > *It isn't hard to create adversarial examples for black-box classifiers*
- Randomize the ad-blocker?
 - > *Adversarial examples robust to random transformations / multiple models*
- Pro-actively retrain the model? (Adversarial training)
 - > *New arms-race: The adversary finds new attacks and ad-blocker re-trains*
 - > *Mounting a new attack is much easier than updating the model*
 - > *On-going research: so far the adversary always wins!*